Donald Gainsborough serves as a leading voice in the evolution of American industrial policy, currently heading Government Curated where he navigates the complex intersection of legislation and economic strategy. With a background as a political savant and a deep understanding of trade dynamics, Gainsborough offers a unique perspective on the shift toward protectionism and its real-world implications for the domestic labor market. His insights are grounded in the current transition of the U.S. manufacturing base, focusing on how tariffs, energy costs, and global diplomacy shape the future of American industry.
The following discussion explores the nuances of modern reindustrialization, covering the uneven success of sectors like steel versus automotive, the impact of fragmented trade deals, and the persistent challenges of workforce recruitment.
Short-term economic friction often precedes long-term reindustrialization. How do you distinguish between temporary market pain and a failing policy, and what specific metrics indicate that a manufacturing base is successfully stabilizing despite initial inflation?
Distinguishing between the “growing pains” of a new policy and a fundamental failure requires looking past immediate price hikes toward structural momentum. We are attempting to reverse a steady decline in manufacturing that has persisted since the 1970s, so a single year of data is rarely enough to declare a policy a failure. One of the most reliable indicators of stabilization is the Manufacturing PMI survey, which has recently shown overall growth in the sector despite significant headwinds. Additionally, we look at the contraction of imports; for instance, steel imports dropped by 12.6 percent in 2025, which suggests that domestic production is reclaiming its own territory. When a machinery manufacturing CEO describes current business growth as a “sweet fragrance” healing years of hardship, it signals a psychological shift in the market that often precedes physical expansion.
Many firms are maximizing current facility output rather than building new factories due to shifting trade duties. What specific milestones would provide enough certainty for executives to invest in new domestic plants, and how can a government balance trade leverage with the need for market predictability?
Executives are currently in a “wait and see” mode because the whipsaw nature of tariff threats makes long-term capital expenditure feel like a gamble. For new facilities to break ground, we need a period of sustained policy “settling” where tariff rates remain consistent for more than a single fiscal cycle. Currently, orders for new machinery have ballooned, showing that firms are willing to invest in technology to squeeze more out of existing footprints, but they won’t build a new plant as fast as a “Spirit Halloween can go into an abandoned retail store.” The government must transition from using tariffs as a “reciprocal” diplomatic stick to establishing them as a permanent floor for domestic competition. True market predictability will only arrive when the legal landscape, currently fragmented by Supreme Court rulings and shifting executive orders, finds a stable, statutory foundation.
Steel production has grown while the auto industry faces challenges with cross-border supply chains and parts costs. Why has the impact of recent trade policies been so uneven across different sectors, and what practical steps can be taken to protect domestic suppliers without undermining final assembly operations?
The unevenness stems from the inherent complexity of modern supply chains, where a car part might cross a border multiple times before final assembly. Steel is a raw commodity that has benefited from a 25 percent tariff “game changer,” boosting domestic output by 2.5 million tons and driving over $25 billion in investment. In contrast, the 25 percent duty on imported autos and parts has created a “fragmented” landscape because North American car companies rely heavily on integrated labor from Canada and Mexico. To protect suppliers without hurting assembly, the government has experimented with rebate programs based on American-made content, but these are often too bureaucratic to be effective. A more practical step would be harmonizing duties across North American partners to ensure that domestic assembly remains more cost-effective than importing finished vehicles from overseas.
Manufacturing job openings are increasing, yet actual hiring remains slow and public interest in factory work is low. Beyond trade barriers, what specific strategies are needed to bridge this recruitment gap, and how can the industry better demonstrate the long-term value of these careers to younger workers?
We are facing a profound cultural gap where 80 percent of Americans believe the country needs more manufacturing, yet only 25 percent actually want to work in a factory. While job openings are expanding according to Labor Department data, the hiring rate is “stuck in the mud” because the image of the industry hasn’t caught up to its modern reality. Bridging this gap requires a move away from the “rust belt” stereotype toward a high-tech, high-wage narrative centered on advanced robotics and precision engineering. Industry leaders must partner with vocational programs to show that these aren’t just “jobs,” but careers with the same longevity as the $25 billion investments currently flowing into sectors like steel. We also need to address the “plant closure” anxiety mentioned by labor leaders; workers will not commit to a sector if they fear their facility will be shuttered in the next trade cycle.
High energy prices are forcing domestic aluminum producers to compete with power-hungry industries like artificial intelligence for resources. How does energy infrastructure directly affect the success of reshoring efforts, and what specific policy adjustments are required to ensure heavy industry remains viable when utility costs fluctuate?
Energy is the silent backbone of reindustrialization, and right now, the competition for power is fierce. Despite high tariffs meant to protect aluminum, domestic production has slowed because these producers simply cannot compete with the sky-high utility rates driven by the massive power demands of AI data centers. If we want to reshore heavy industry, we cannot treat energy policy as separate from trade policy; they are two sides of the same coin. Specific adjustments should include preferential energy pricing or dedicated grid access for strategic “energy-intense” manufacturing to insulate them from market volatility. Without a robust and affordable energy infrastructure, even the highest tariff wall in the world won’t be enough to keep a power-hungry aluminum smelter operational in the United States.
Recent trade agreements have lowered tariff rates for several international partners to 15 percent, creating a fragmented landscape for domestic companies. How do these specific country-level deals impact the overall goal of reshoring production, and what are the primary trade-offs when using duties as a tool for diplomatic leverage?
These country-specific deals, such as those with Japan, South Korea, and the EU, often undermine the very goal of reshoring by making it cheaper to produce abroad than within North America. When we lower auto tariff rates to 15 percent for specific allies, we create a loophole that global firms are more than happy to exploit. The primary trade-off is that using duties as diplomatic leverage—meant to open foreign markets or raise revenue—frequently dilutes the protectionist “wall” needed to force manufacturing back to American soil. This creates a “fragmented policy landscape” that makes it nearly impossible for a domestic CEO to plan a five-year investment strategy. Ultimately, diplomatic “wins” on the world stage can sometimes feel like “losses” for a factory worker in a town facing continued plant closures.
What is your forecast for American manufacturing?
My forecast is one of “cautious expansion” punctuated by high-intensity volatility as we move toward the late 2020s. We are currently seeing the “balm of Gilead” in machinery and steel, where massive investments and a 12.6 percent drop in steel imports suggest that the foundation for a revival is being poured. However, the next three years will be a trial by fire as industries like aluminum and automotive struggle to balance high energy costs and complex cross-border supply chains. If the administration can move from “big talk” to completing the 12 sector-specific probes launched in 2025 and providing a stable regulatory environment, we will see the “sweet fragrance” of growth turn into a permanent industrial boom. The tools are on the table, but the success of the American factory depends entirely on whether we can provide the policy certainty and energy security that domestic capital demands.
